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I. INTRODUCTION
"Seminal" is one of the most overworked words in the legal lexi-
James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.,
Fordham College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954. The author has re-
cently been selected by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to serve as
reporter to a committee drafting a model statute on employment termination.
This article had been planned long before that appointment. The opinions ex-
pressed herein are solely the author's. At this writing the Commissioners have
not begun their formal deliberations.
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con. But if ever two pieces of writing deserved that appellation, they
are the 1967 article by Professor Lawrence Blades' advocating judicial
development of the tort of "abusive discharge" as a limitation on the
doctrine of employment at will, and the 1976 article by Professor
Clyde Summers2 advocating legislation to protect individual employ-
ees against unjust dismissal. At the time Blades wrote there was vir-
tually no precedent directly supporting his position, and he may have
been unaware of what little did exist.3 After concluding that the rigid-
ities the consideration requirement would prevent resort to contract
theory, Blades argued for the extension of tort law.4 He relied princi-
pally on the notion that even the exercise of a right may be actionable
if ulterior purposes or wrongful motives intrude, citing as an analogy
the abuse of legal process.5 Within a dozen or so years following
Blades's piece, the highest courts of such influential states as Califor-
nia,6 Illinois,7 Massachusetts,8 Michigan, 9 and New YorkO had drawn
upon a variety of both tort and contract doctrines to engraft qualifica-
tions on the conventional employment-at-will principle. By now a to-
tal of about forty jurisdictions have recognized some modification of
the traditional rule. 1 Unlike Blades, who viewed the prospects for
legislative reform as "dim" because of the absence of any strong lobby
favoring it,12 Summers considered statutory protection against unjust
dismissal a necessity, on the grounds the courts had demonstrated "an
unwillingness to break through their self-created crust of legal doc-
trine."13 As it has turned out, we have profited from the differing in-
sights of both men. Blades was right that the legislatures would be
slow to move, and that a modest extension and adaptation of well-es-
tablished common law principles would enable the courts to provide at
least some measure of relief. Summers was right, as I shall indicate
shortly, that accepted legal doctrines permit only a limited and inade-
1. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967).
2. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissai Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
3. E.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344
P.2d 25 (1959) (public policy prevents employer from firing employee for refusing
to perjure himself on behalf of employer).
4. Blades, supra note 1, at 1420-23.
5. Id. at 1423-24.
6. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 2d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980).
7. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
8. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
9. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
10. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982).
11. [IERM] 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51 (1987).
12. Blades, supra note 1, at 1434.
13. Summers, supra note 2, at 521.
1988]
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quate response to employees' legitimate claims. Legislation will ulti-
mately be needed.
There are signs the idea is taking root. Bills forbidding wrongful
discharge have been introduced in a dozen or more legislatures.14 A
special committee of the Labor and Employment Law Section of the
State Bar of California has recommended statutory regulation of un-
just dismissal.15 The individual rights committee of the ABA Section
on Labor and Employment Law has drafted a questionnaire regarding
the critical issues to be considered in any proposed legislation.16 The
AFL-CIO's Executive Council has discarded organized labor's long-
standing ambivalence about the subject by endorsing the concept of
wrongful discharge legislation.17 The Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws have decided to draft a model statute.1 8 And finally, just
twenty years after Blades's trail-blazing article, Montana became the
first state to enact a comprehensive law protecting employees against
unjust discharge.19
In this paper, I shall briefly review the nature and limitations of
the theories most frequently invoked by the courts in dealing with
wrongful dismissal. I shall then examine the major arguments for and
against a general overhaul of the doctrine of employment at will.
Lastly, I shall discuss some of the particular questions that will have
to be addressed in fashioning a statutory solution.
II. JUDICIAL THEORIES OF UNJUST DISCHARGE
During the past decade or so American courts have employed three
main theories to soften the worst rigors of what was once the well-
nigh universal rule that employers "may dismiss their employees at
will . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong."20 Those three doctrines include tort-violations of public pol-
icy, or "abusive" or "retaliatory" discharge; breach of an express or
implied contract; and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. In addition to the claim of wrongful discharge, employees su-
ing their former employers often add more traditional claims, such as
14. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and the U.S.
Congress. See, e.g., Ann Arbor, [Mich.] News, June 10, 1984, at C5, col. 1; Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 3, 1987, at A-8.
15. Labor and Employment Law News (State Bar of Cal. Lab. & Emp. L. Sec.), Feb.
8, 1984, at 1-46.
16. 1 LAB. LAW. 784 (1985).
17. [IER cases] 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA), Mar. 3, 1987, at 1.
18. Conversation on September 11, 1987 between the author and Professor William J.
Pierce, Excecutive Director of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
19. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 3, 1987, at A-8.
20. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also H. WOOD, LAW
OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
[Vol. 67:56
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intentional infliction of emotional distress; defamation and injury to
business reputation; fraud and misrepresentation; invasion of privacy;
negligence; and tortious interference with contractual relations. I
shall not deal with these miscellaneous causes of action.
A. Tort Theories
1. Discharges Contrary to "Public Policy"
The first cracks in the inhospitable "crust" of judicial doctrine that
formerly precluded relief against wrongful dismissal came, as one
might have expected, in some cases that were simply too malodorous
for the courts to tolerate. Typical was Petermann v. Local 396, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters,2 1 where an employee was fired for
refusing to perjure himself at the behest of his employer. Not to rec-
ognize a cause of action in such circumstances would effectively con-
done a grave violation of a basic public policy. The public policy
exception to the at-will principle spans a spectrum of situations.
Petermann is at one extreme; the employee, was actually discharged
for declining to commit a crime. I should like to think that today no
court would be so enmeshed in outworn theory that it would hesitate
to remedy a dismissal based on an employee's refusal to engage in a
clearcut instance of unlawful conduct. Next along the spectrum are
cases where employees are fired for performing a public duty, such as
serving on a jury22 or "blowing the whistle" on wrongdoing within a
company.23 Finally, there are situations where the discharge results
from the exercise of a legal right or privilege. An employee may have
filed a workers' compensation claim,24 for example, or spoken out
against his company's stand on pending legislation.25
Surely the crassest (and easiest) of these public policy cases -
where criminal conduct has been importuned - will be few and far
between. As one moves across the spectrum toward more common
situations, the issues become more difficult for the courts. What is the
reach of "public policy"? It may be one thing if the "whistleblower"
21. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). See also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 7 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980) (refusal to join price-fixing conspiracy).
22. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
23. Causes of action were recognized in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), and Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85
Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981), but rejected in Geary v. United States Steel
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), and Murphy v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983). Some of these seemingly contrary
decisions are reconcilable on their facts.
24. Causes of action were recognized in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IMI. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978), and Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1983), but rejected in Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978), and Segal v.
Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
25. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
1988]
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has been subpoenaed to appear at an official inquiry. It may be quite
another if he has taken it upon himself to share his good-faith (but
erroneous and damaging) suspicions with the media. What inference
does one draw if the legislature has not expressly prohibited employer
reprisals against employees filing workers' compensation or unem-
ployment insurance claims?26 One court may be so bold as to draw
upon the United States Constitution's First Amendment as a source of
public policy protecting employees' speech even against private em-
ployers.27 Other courts may find controlling the traditional view that
constitutional rights can ordinarily be asserted only against govern-
mental action.28 Still other courts have treated the whole concept of
public policy as unsuited for judicial application in this context, and
instead have declared it a matter to be left to the legislature.29 Except
perhaps in the most egregious circumstances, therefore, common-law
principles of public policy provide no guaranteed recourse for the
wronged worker.
2. "Abusive" or "Retaliatory" Discharges
Beyond the more standard public policy exceptions, some courts
have recognized a cause of action when an employer has sought to ex-
ploit his position for personal advantage. One celebrated decision sus-
tained a suit by a female worker who was fired for refusing to date her
foreman.30 Other courts, however, have declined to remedy such per-
sonal abuse or similar retaliatory conduct.31 They apparently believe
that the public policy exception should not be stretched to cover what
essentially are disputes between individuals. Despite commentators'
arguments that all unjust dismissals subvert the community's interest
in industrial stability and productivity,32 there is a growing tendency
to require that the public policy relied upon be "clearly articulated"
and "well accepted," 33 or even that it be "evidenced by a constitutional
26. See supra note 24.
27. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
28. Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985); Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.,
106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).
29. Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 488 N.E.2d 86 (1983); see
also Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
30. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). But cf. Howard v.
Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 296-97, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980).
31. E.g., Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976);
Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 631 S.W.2d 263 (1982).
32. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1948 (1983).
33. Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 367, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (1984)
(Williams, C.J., dissenting); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp.,
147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (1985).
[Vol. 67:56
HeinOnline  -- 67 Neb. L. Rev. 60 1988
A SEED GERMINATES
or statutory provision." 34 That is not going to help many workers sub-
jected to arbitrary or capricious treatment or personally motivated
abuse.
B. Contract Theories
In the past, not even an employer's assurance of "permanent" em-
ployment would change the arrangement from that of an at-will con-
tract.35 In the early 1980s, however, a number of courts began taking
employers at their word. Statements of policy set forth in personnel
manuals or employee handbooks, or oral commitments to employees
at the time of hiring, were found to constitute, either separately or in
combination, an express or implied contract that the employee would
not be discharged except for "just cause." Leading decisions included
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,3 6 in California, Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield,37 in Michigan, and Weiner v. McGraw-Hil, Inc.,38 in New
York. But many courts continued to regard such employer declara-
tions as merely nonbinding expressions of present intent.39
Even in states whose courts accept the new contractual qualifica-
tion on employment at will, an employer with a careful lawyer should
have little trouble in avoiding liability. Unequivocal language in a job
application that any resulting employment will be only at will,40 or a
clear and prominent disclaimer in an employee handbook that any
policy statements are not legally binding,41 will generally foreclose
employee claims.
A greater problem is the employer's unilateral deletion of a job
34. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561,573,335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983);
see also Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Edwards v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 286 Ky. 341,150 S.W.2d 916 (1941); Note,
Employee Handbooks and Employment At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196,
200-04.
36. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). Accord Cleary v. American Air
Lines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (1980); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333
N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d
489 (Ky. 1983).
37. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
38. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982).
39. Mau v. Oklahoma Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Heideck v.
Kent Gen. Hosp., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); White v. Chelsea Indus., 425 So. 2d
1090 (Ala. 1983).
40. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); French v. Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc., 285 Ark. 332, 686 S.W.2d 435 (1985). But cf. Tirano v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 99 A.D.2d 675, 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1984).
41. Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284,289-91,491 A.2d 1257,1260, modi-
fied on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). But cf. Wagenseller v. Scotts-
dale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (unclear); Schipani v.
Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981) (subsequent assur-
ance); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985) (same).
1988]
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security guarantee previously contained in an employee handbook or
other policy statement. As to subsequently hired employees, of
course, there should be no doubts about the efficacy of the revoca-
tion.42 The bothersome question concerns incumbent employees, who
have operated under the protective provision for some period of time.
If the employer has retained the power, either expressly43 or im-
pliedly,44 to change working terms and personnel policies unilaterally,
that would seem to be dispositive. If such a reservation of power can-
not be found, the question becomes even stickier. Where is the consid-
eration for the employee's surrender of an existing right? Yet an
employer can fairly argue that all the terms of employment are inher-
ently variable, and that consideration can be found in the employer's
continuation of (or, better, increase in) pay and other benefits.45 Such
an approach would not seem at odds with the proposition that an em-
ployer could not fire at his whim a particular individual while he still
has in effect a "just cause" guarantee as part of his overall personnel
policy. Naturally, if a given employee could demonstrate that she had
specifically and detrimentally relied on her employer's assurances of
job security, for example, by declining alternative work opportunities,
that might immunize her against a later withdrawal of the
safeguard.46
Apart from the employer's capacity to eliminate or restrict contrac-
tual rights, another deficiency in the contract approach is that policy
declarations are likely to be confined to the more enlightened business
firms, and that oral assurances or other individualized guarantees are
likely to be confined to middle-level or higher ranking management
42. See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
43. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880,
894-95 (1980).
44. See Bullock v. Automobile Club, 146 Mich. App. 711, 720-21, 381 N.W.2d 793, 797
(1985), on appeal as Dkt. No. 78027, Mich. Sup. Ct.
45. Cf. Enis v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1986).
This position would appear analogous to the view of a number of courts that con-
sideration for the employer's promise of job security lies in the employee's contin-
ued rendition of services. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J.
284, 301-03, 491 A.2d 1257, 1267, modified on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d
515 (1985); Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., 720 P.2d 632 (Idaho 1986); Cook
v. Heck's, Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 459 (W. Va. 1986). For the view that a job protec-
tion provision cannot be rescinded without "independent" consideration, see
Stack v. Allstate Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 472, 477-78 (S.D. Ind. 1985). In Bankey v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., Dkt. No. 84-1296, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit certified to the Michigan Supreme Court, Dkt. No. 78200, the question
whether an employer who has created a "just cause" employment contract can
later unilaterally alter the employment relationship as to existing employees to
permit discharge at will.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979); cf. Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d
791, 794 (Ala. 1982); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 483
N.E.2d 150, 155 (1985).
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personnel. That leaves the rank-and-file worker in the small, margi-
nal plant or shop - the very person who probably needs protection
the most - bereft of contract rights.
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Potentially the most expansive judicial qualification of the emplpy-
ment-at-will doctrine is based on the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.47 The principle was first elaborated as to employment con-
tracts in the leading Massachusetts case of Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co.48 The facts, as a jury was permitted to find them, were
appalling. A veteran salesman of twenty-five years had been working
for some time on a five million dollar order. Just after the sale was
consummated, he was fired. By special verdict a jury determined that
the employer had acted in "bad faith." The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts concluded the jury could properly have found that the
employer's reason for terminating the salesman was to deprive him of
a portion of the full commission due him. Such action was deemed a
breach of the covenant of "good faith and fair dealing" imposed by law
on the parties to any contract.
Fortune plainly suggests a substantial extension of the traditional
contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing. Ordinarily it has not
been seen as a catch-all safeguard against any arbitrary conduct on the
part of a contracting party, such as an unjust dismissal, but rather as a
fairly specific duty imposed by law that neither party do anything
which will interfere with the other's performance of its contractual
obligations or which will interfere with the right of the other to re-
ceive the benefits of the agreement. 49 The doctrine has not been con-
cerned with the right to terminate a contract as such. Furthermore,
resort to a novel articulation of the good faith concept was hardly nec-
essary in Fortune. Good faith could have been invoked concerning the
nonpayment only, without regard to the discharge itself. Or the clas-
sic principle that full or substantial performance entitles a contracting
party to the agreed price would have served quite adequately.50
At least one California court has indicated that the covenant of
47. Arguing for a broad reading of the covenant that could well eviscerate the whole
at-will doctrine is Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1816 (1980).
Coming close to this view is Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487
(Mont. 1984); see also Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d
1063 (1982); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984).
48. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See also Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus
Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982); Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jack-
son & Curtiss, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) (Minnesota law).
49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); 3 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 570-71 (1960).
50. 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 700 (1960).
1988]
HeinOnline  -- 67 Neb. L. Rev. 63 1988
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
good faith and fair dealing does protect at least a long-service em-
ployee from discharge without just cause. In Cleary v. American Air-
lines, Inc.,51 the employer had established an internal grievance
procedure for resolving employee disputes, and the employee in ques-
tion was an eighteen-year veteran at the time of his discharge. The
California Court of Appeals seemed to concentrate at one point only
on the latter factor when it stated: "Termination of employment with-
out legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts in-
cluding employment contracts." 52 Cleary also held that a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort as well as
contract, thereby allowing punitive in addition to compensatory
damages.53
Several courts have expressly rejected a broad application of the
implied covenant of good faith. In Murphy v. American Home Prod-
ucts Corp.,54 the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that any im-
plied covenant would have to be "in aid and furtherance of other
terms of the agreement of the parties." The court then went on to
observe that the plaintiff's employment in this instance was at will,
leaving the employer "an unfettered right to terminate."55 The court
concluded: "In the context of such an employment it would be incon-
gruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the employer im-
pliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of
termination."56 This logic seems sufficiently compelling that the
good-faith covenant appears unlikely to become a universally accepted
51. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). Later California decisions have
differed over the significance of an employee's longevity in good-faith covenant
cases. Compare Wheeler v. Hershey Chocolate Co., No. 196250 (Cal. App. Aug. 18,
1985) (longevity alone not sufficient) with Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App.
3d 813, 821, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573 (longevity helpful but not essential). Cf. Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 241, 219 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1985), cert
granted, 222 Cal. Rptr. 740, (1986) (seven years longevity not enough).
52. Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. 772, 729
(1980).
53. Although Fortune and other decisions have treated breaches of the covenant as
sounding in contract, the notion that there may be a tortious breach in certain
circumstances (thus opening the door for punitive damages) has been followed in
Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984); Eller v.
Houston's Restaurants, Inc., 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2651, 2653-54 (D.D.C. 1984).
54. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). Accord Walker v. Modern
Realty, 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App.
3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982); Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F. Supp. 1286
(N.D. Ill. 1983); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834
(1983); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987).
55. Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983).
56. Id. at 304-05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
[Vol. 67:56
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panacea for wrongfully discharged employees. 57
III. THE PROS AND CONS OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
In my judgment the courts of the more progressive states, like Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, and Mchigan, have gone about as far with un-
just discharge actions as they are going to go. They will entertain suits
alleging serious violations of accepted public policy. They will hold
employers to their unretracted word not to fire except for good rea-
son. But ordinarily they will not impose an affirmative obligation on
employers to prove just cause to support a discharge. And even where
a contractual protection is found, the trial court may, as in a leading
California case, instruct the jury that it cannot substitute its opinion
for the employer's as to whether plaintiff's work performance was sat-
isfactory, and that "just cause" for termination means a "fair and hon-
est cause or reason, regulated by good faith on the part of the party
exercising the power."5 8 In short, the courts are unlikely to subject
nonunion firms, as a matter of common law, to the same requirements
exacted contractually of nearly every employer party to a collective
bargaining agreement. The next move therefore seems up to the legis-
latures. That calls for a thorough appraisal of the theory and opera-
tion of employment at will.
Following the pioneering studies of Blades5 9 and Summers,6 0 a ver-
itable tidal wave of scholarly condemnation has descended upon the
at-will employment doctrine.61 For most commentators, it is a matter
57. No more than a dozen states have accepted the good-faith covenant theory in
holdings or dictum. [IERM] 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:51 (1988) (twelve states
with Oklahoma now excluded); Lab. L. Rep. (CCH), Insight at 4 (May 1987) (five
states with Oklahoma now excluded).
58. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,330,171 Cal. Rptr. 917,928 (1981)
(on remand); see also Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 100-01, 643
P.2d 1276, 1278-79 (1982). But cf. Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 408
Mich. 579, 623-24, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896 (1980). There are differences of view
whether a plaintiff employee should bear the ultimate burden of persuasion con-
cerning the issue of employer breach, or whether, as in the usual labor arbitration
proceeding, the burden is on the employer. Compare Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) and Schmidly v. Perry Motor
Freight, Inc., 735 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arkansas law) with Rasch v. City of
East Jordan, 141 Mich. App. 336, 367 N.W.2d 856 (1985).
59. Blades, supra note 1..
60. Summers, supra no0e 2.
61. See, eg., Aaron, Constitutional Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from Em-
ployment" Some Reflections, in NEw TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
13 (H. Anderson ed. 1976); Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A
Changing Concept of Employment At Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (1980); Blum-
rosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause" Protection
Under Title VII, 2 IND. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Em-
ployment, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); St. Antoine, Protection Against Unjust Disci-
pline: An Idea Whose Time Has Long Since Come, in ARBrrRATION ISSUES FOR
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of simple justice. Conceptually, there appears little or nothing to be
said in favor of an employer's right to treat its employees arbitrarily or
unfairly. Moreover, it is not just a theoretical problem. One careful
observer has estimated:
Some 60 million U.S. employees are subject to the employment-at-will doc-
trine and about 2 million of them are discharged each year .... About 150,000
of these workers would have been found to have been discharged without just
cause and reinstated to their former jobs if they had had the right to appeal to
an impartial arbitrator as do almost all unionized workers.6 2
Probably the most vigorous and undaunted academic defender of
the at-will principle is Professor Richard Epstein6 3 of the University
of Chicago. He launches a three-pronged counterattack. First, at-will
contracts are fair because freedom of contract is an aspect of individ-
ual liberty; "the employee is the full owner of his labor," and he and
the employer are generally "free to exchange on whatever terms and
conditions they see fit."64 Second, at-will contracts are mutually bene-
ficial. They enable both parties to monitor the other's behavior; "the
worker can quit whenever the net value of the employment contract
turns negative."6 5 Workers also benefit from the "asymmetry of
reputational losses;" the single large employer has more to lose if his
many good employees perceive the dismissal of a coworker as arbi-
trary.66 In addition, workers are helped in dealing with "risk diversifi-
cation" since the contract at will offsets "the concentration of
individual investment in a single job."67 Furthermore, the system is
"very cheap to administer;" there aren't any litigation costs and per-
sonnel expenses are kept down.68 Finally, no inequality of bargaining
power can be demonstrated; if it did, "[w]ages should be driven to zero,
for no matter what their previous level, the employer could use his
(inexhaustible) bargaining power to reduce them further."69 Profes-
THE 1980s - PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 43 (J. Stern & B. Dennis eds. 1982); Stieber, The Case
for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RE-
SEARCH ASSOCIATION 155 (B. Dennis ed. 1980); Symposium, Individual Rights in
the Workplace: The Employment-at-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J. REF. 199 (1983).
62. Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985).
63. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984); see also
Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment at Will Doctrine: Management Consid-
erations, 40 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1982); Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will
Rule, 27 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 881 (1983); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at
Will-Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer? 35 VAND. L. REv. 201 (1982).
64. Epstein, supra note 63, at 955.
65. Id. at 966.
66. Id. at 967-68.
67. Id. at 969.
68. Id. at 970.
69. Id. at 973. But even the overly pessimistic "iron law of wages" propounded by
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sor Epstein's third principal point deals with distributional concerns.
He contends that modifications in the at-will doctrine "cannot hope to
transfer wealth systematically from rich to poor on the model of com-
prehensive systems of taxation or welfare benefits."o
A wondrous Oz-like air of unreality pervades much of the Epstein
thesis. His analysis admits of no living, breathing human beings, who
develop irrational antagonisms or exercise poor judgment, on the one
hand, or who suffer the psychological as well as the economic devasta-
tion of losing a job, on the other. Numerous studies document the in-
creases in cardiovascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdowns,
alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse and child abuse, impaired social
relationships, and various other diseases and abnormal conditions that
develop even in the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting
from plant closures.71 It seems reasonable to presume that such ef-
fects are at least as severe when a worker is singled out to be dis-
charged for some alleged deficiency or misconduct. Even if Epstein is
right in everything he has to say about employees collectively, it is this
piercing hurt to individuals which justifies the call for reform of the
at-will doctrine.
There is a logical nicety to the notion that abolition of at-will em-
ployment would jeopardize a worker's present "freedom to quit," ca-
pacity for "risk diversification," and so on. But that whole argument
turns on an erroneous equation of an employee's right to leave with an
employer's right to fire. In fact, there is probably no more discredited
concept in modem contract law than the unqualified requirement of
"mutuality of obligation."7 2 Consideration on the part of the em-
ployee is the essential element, and for an increasing number of mod-
em courts that is found in her actual rendition of services.73 Even
more important, in the real world of industrial relations, employees
Malthus, Marx, and others could only reduce workers' pay to the minimum sub-
sistence level. See, ag., P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 553 (6th ed. 1965). For a more
realistic discussion of the disparity in employer and employee bargaining power,
see L. REYNOLDS, S. MASTERs & C. MOsER, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS 7-8 (9th ed. 1986) [hereinafter LABOR ECONOMICS].
70. Epstein, supra note 63, at 977.
71. See, e.g., H. BRENNER, EsTATING THE SOcIAL COSTS OF NATIONAL ECONOMC
POLICY- IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH AND CLINICAL AG-
GRESSION (1976); B. BLuEsToNE & B. HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA 63-66 (1982), and authorities cited; L. FERMAN & J. GoRDus, THE ECON-
oMY AND MENTAL HEALTH (1979); L. FERmAN, M. AIEN & H. SHEPPARD, Eco-
NOMIC FAILURE, ALIENATION, AND EXTREMISM (1968).
72. See, eg., 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTs §§ 152, 163, 165-67 (1963); Eales v.
Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959-60 (Alaska 1983);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,325-26,171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 924-25
(1981).
73. See, eg., 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 163 (1963); see also sources cited
supra note 45.
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seldom quit voluntarily.74 It is they, not the employer, who most need
protection. It is thus neither unfair nor contrary to contemporary con-
tract theory to eliminate the employer's power to discharge arbitrarily
without eliminating the employee's right to leave.
It is probably true that some costs would be associated with alter-
ing the at-will nature of employment contracts. One scholar has sug-
gested a lower wage level would result because of both a decrease in
the demand for labor and an increase in the supply.75 In effect, the
employees themselves would have paid at least partially for their
greater job security. That is a time-honored tradeoff among unionized
workers,76 however, and should not be considered inappropriate here.
It is hard to determine what, if any, would be the net increases in em-
ployers' costs in maintaining a for-cause discharge system. But there
is evidence they would not be exorbitant. For example, in all the de-
mands by unionized firms for "givebacks" or bargaining concessions
during the early 1980s, practically never did employers seek the re-
moval of "just cause" contract clauses, or the grievance and arbitration
procedures supporting them.
American business would not lose out in "competitiveness" in in-
ternational markets by elimination of at-will employment, even
though it might lose some degree of flexibility in job arrangements.
Protection against unfair discharge is now provided by statute in about
sixty countries around the world, including all the Common Market,
Sweden and Norway, Japan, Canada, and others in South America,
Africa, and Asia.77 The International Labor Organization recom-
mended in 1963 and again in 1982 that workers not be terminated ex-
cept for a valid reason.7 8 The United States remains the last major
industrial democracy that has not heeded the call for unjust dismissal
74. See, e.g., LABOR ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 9 ("most workers regard resort to
the market - that is, a change of employers - as a disaster rather than as an
opportunity"). Cf. Kerr, The Balkanization of Labor Markets, in LABOR MOBIL-
ITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNrrY (E. Bakke ed. 1954), reprinted in L. REYNOLDS
ET AL., READINGS IN LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 66, 68 (4th ed.
1986).
75. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract" An Interest and
Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOwA L. REv. 327 (1984).
76. See, e.g., R. FREEMAN & J. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 55-56 (1984); LABOR
ECONOMICS, supra note 69, at 533.
77. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Em-
ployment Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36
Tim RECORD 170, 175 (1981).
78. Id. at 179-80; Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initia-
tive of the Employer (No. 158) INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (Supp.) (Sixty-eighth session) (June 22, 1982). It must be noted,
however, that foreign legislation is hardly everything that workers might desire.
Reinstatement is rare; backpay is usually limited to a brief period; and sometimes
a short notice (e.g., 30 days) will suffice. See, eg., Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal
Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 310 (1985).
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legislation. Furthermore, experience both here and abroad suggests
that the prevention of arbitrary treatment of employees may be not
only humane but also good business. Marked correlations have been
observed between a secure work force and high productivity and qual-
ity output.79
Under a more rational, systematic method of dealing with im-
proper terminations, many employers would be saved the crushing fi-
nancial liability incurred by companies that have felt the wrath of
aroused juries under our existing, capricious common-law regime. For
example, an early study showed that plaintiffs in California won as
many as 90 percent of the discharge cases that went to juries, with the
average award being $450,000.80 A more recent California survey by a
management attorney revealed relatively little change. Juries re-
turned verdicts for plaintiffs in 78 percent of the cases, averaging a
total of $424,527 in general and punitive damages.81 Single individuals
have received jury awards covering actual and punitive damages as
high as $20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million,
$1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 million.8 2 One could well imagine
that eventually an informed employer lobby might conclude that com-
prehensive just cause legislation, which would exclude jury verdicts
and punitive damages, was the preferable solution.
A critical factor in securing legislative relief may be the attitude of
organized labor.83 It is about the only nationwide interest group that
might be willing to take the lead in promoting such a cause. A com-
mon assumption, however, is that many unions will not favor legisla-
tion protecting employees against arbitrary treatment by employers
because it will eliminate or detract from one of the unions' prime sell-
ing points in their efforts to organize the unorganized. I cannot deny
this possibility, but I think it would be as shortsighted as was organ-
ized labor's initial hostility toward the Fair Labor Standards Act.84
First, and not insignificantly, organized labor could profit considerably
from refurbishing its image as the champion of the disadvantaged.
Second, and perhaps more practically, a universal rule against dismis-
79. Foulkes, Large Nonunionized Employers, in U.S. INusTmiAL RELATIONS 1950-
1980: A CRTICAL ASSESSMENT 129, 134-36, 141-44, 155-56 (1981); R. PASCALE & A.
ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT 131-57 (1979). Cf. Special Task
Force, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, WORK IN AMERICA 93-110, 188-
201 (1973).
80. Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood and Goliath," 62 MICH.
B.J. 776 (1983).
81. Discharge Verdicts Average $424,527 in California, 9 Lab. Rel. Rep., 1 Individual
Employment Rts. (BNA) No. 14, at 3 (Mar. 3, 1987).
82. F. Lopatka & J. Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, in
ABA NATIONAL INSTITuTE ON I TIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION
OF PRIVACY CLAIMS vii, 13-18 (1986).
83. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
84. F. DuLLEs, LABOR IN AMERICA 283-85 (2d rev. 1960).
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sal without cause should actually prove beneficial to unions in their
organizing drives. Now, when a union sympathizer is fired in the mid-
dle of a campaign, it must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence that a motivating factor in the discharge was the exercise of
rights protected by the National Labor Relations Act.8 5 This is fre-
quently a burden too heavy to bear. With a just cause requirement
generally applicable, it would be up to the employer to show that some
positive, acceptable basis existed for the discharge. Finally, I believe
there is a strong likelihood that just cause standards will act more as a
spur than a hindrance to union organizing. The promise of fair treat-
ment will be held out to employees; the promise may remain a tanta-
lizing and unrealized dream, however, unless there is present the
means to realize it. Constant, effective representation and advocacy is
the surest way to ensure any right. That is a lesson public sector un-
ions have already learned in representing employees in civil service
proceedings.
In addition to the possible reservations of organized labor, some
neutrals in industrial relations might oppose a statutory just cause re-
quirement for fear that it would erode such worthy values as volunta-
rism, private initiative, and workplace creativity, and more
particularly the collective bargaining process itself. I, too, treasure the
unique American institution of union-employer bargaining, but when
even so hardheaded an observer as John Dunlop can be found rhapso-
dizing on its "beauty,"86 I think we should all be wary about being
carried away by the mystique of the process. Collective bargaining,
after all, is a means and not an end. The objective is the betterment of
the individual working person. When only about a quarter to a third
of the labor force is currently afforded protection against unjust disci-
pline, I feel the needs of the great majority outweigh some theoretical
risk to traditional bargaining processes. Even then, assuming history
is any guide, we underrate the flexibility and resilience of collective
bargaining if we believe it cannot adapt to, and indeed exploit, a new
legal environment.8 7
IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
If employees are to be fully and effectively protected against unjust
discipline, new specialized legislation will ultimately be necessary.
85. Miller Elec. Mfg. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. West Point Mfg.
Co., 245 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,
462 U.S. 393 (1983).
86. Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in CHALLENGES TO COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 168, 173 (L. Ulman ed. 1967).
87. Traditionally, labor unions have used statutory minimum standards as a base on
which to build greater employee protections. See generally Fillion & Trebilcock,
The Duty to Bargain Under ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 251 (1975).
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The judiciary, as we have seen, may be able to respond to extreme
cases and to the atypical situations of middle-management personnel.
But the courts have no capacity to construct an administrative appara-
tus for enforcement purposes, and their more formalized processes are
not readily accessible to rank-and-file workers. Nor do I see much
hope in either the Constitution or existing civil rights legislation. To
me the former route seems barred by the courts' increasing reluctance
to expand the "state action" concept,88 and the latter by the need to
accord some modicum of respect to the legislative intent to forbid job
discrimination only on the specified bases of "race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, age," and the like.89 It comes down, then, to a matter of
further legislation. A federal statute applying uniformly to employers
in all sections of the country would probably be the best solution, but
it seems unlikely in the near future. State legislation appears more
promising, and it offers the compensating advantage of an opportunity
for some healthy experimentation with alternative procedures. Dur-
ing the past few years bills have been drafted in such states as Califor-
nia,9 O Michigan, 9 ' and New Jersey92 to provide "just cause" protection
to unorganized workers. The first comprehensive statute has now
been- enacted in Montana.9 3 In the remainder of this paper I shall con-
sider some of the principal issues almost any statutory proposal will
have to confront. Obviously, there will often be substantial values in
competing approaches, and more than one choice could be supported.
My own suggestions will try to take account of both the ideal and the
politically feasible.
A. "Just Cause" Standard
The first question can be disposed of the easiest. The statute
should articulate a standard for lawful discharge or discipline in terms
of "just cause" or equivalent language, without further definition.
Even in Western European countries having nothing like the body of
American arbitral precedent interpreting "just cause" requirements,
there has apparently been little difficulty in applying broadly phrased
statutory criteria. Any effort at specification is bound to risk underin-
clusiveness. The decisionmakers can be counted on to flesh out "just
cause" in the same way as have the arbitrators. Nonetheless, political
88. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
89. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1982)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1982)).
90. Cal. A. B. 3017 (1984); Cal. S. B. 1348 (1985); Cal. A. B. 1400 (1985).
91. Mich. H.B. 5155 (1983).
92. N.J.A.B. 1832 (1980).
93. Mont. H.B. 241 (now codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987)).
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expediency might call for restricting statutory protection, at least as a
first step, to an enumerated list of the most common abuses.
The statute should probably remain discreetly silent on such items
as the burden and the quantum of proof. The differing standards that
have been applied by public tribunals in job discrimination cases and
by private arbitrators under collective bargaining agreements will tug
in opposite directions. Concrete cases would appear to provide the
best vehicle for dealing with such issues.
B. Protected Classes of Employees
It is hard to argue in principle that any employee should be subject
to an unjust termination. Still, when one reaches the presidency of a
Fortune 500 company, it does not seem wholly unfitting that one ac-
cepts the risk of being confronted one day by an announcement from
the chairman of the board, "I'm getting rid of you because I don't like
you." Beyond that, there are practical reasons for excluding certain
classes of employees from the protection of a statute.
1. Managers and Supervisors
In the higher ranges of management, one official's evaluation of
another's business judgment may become so intertwined with ques-
tions of fair personal treatment that the two cannot be separated.
That does not reach down to the level of shop foremen and other su-
pervisors, who are excluded from the organizational protections of the
National Labor Relations Act because they are management's imme-
diate representatives to rank-and-file employees and any union that
may be bargaining for them. This concern about potential conflicts of
interest plainly does not apply to "just cause" legislation, and supervi-
sors as such should be covered. More troubling is the position of mid-
dle-management personnel, who are among the most exposed and
vulnerable. Unfortunately, our lexicon of industrial relations usage
does not contain a convenient term distinguishing middle manage-
ment, who we should protect, from higher management, who we may
wish to exclude. A sensible solution is to except persons entitled to a
pension above a certain amount, or persons with a fixed-term contract
of two years or more.
2. Probationary Employees
There is almost a presumption that an employer will not dismiss an
employee unfairly in the early days of employment--otherwise, why
hire? Moreover, the first few weeks or months of employment enable
the employer to size up the new recruit and assess his or her perform-
ance on the job. At the same time, it is not until an employee has been
part of an establishment for some measurable time that he can reason-
[Vol. 67:56
HeinOnline  -- 67 Neb. L. Rev. 72 1988
A SEED GERMINATES
ably feel he possesses anything like an equity in his position. For all
these reasons it is generally recognized in collective bargaining agree-
ments and elsewhere that so-called "probationary" employees are not
entitled to just cause protections. One expert would make the proba-
tion period one year;94 Summers and the Michigan and New Jersey
bills opt for six months.95 The latter seems adequate to me. But this
is an appropriate area of compromise, and the California bill specifies
two years.96
3. Small Employers
Theoretically, job protections should not depend on the size of the
employer. Indeed, arbitrariness and individual spite may well be more
common on the part of an idiosyncratic sole entrepreneur than on the
part of a large, structured corporation. Nonetheless, we feel uneasy
about intruding too hastily into the sometimes intensely personal re-
lationships of small, intimate establishments. There is also concern
about dissipating our resources in an endless pursuit of minor culprits
instead of concentrating on the major malefactors. A suitable dividing
line, at least at the outset, would seem to be employers having be-
tween ten97 and fifteen98 or more employees.
4. Public Employees
Public employees generally have constitutional guarantees against
the deprivation of their "vested" job interest without due process. Ap-
proximately half also have more specific civil service or tenure protec-
tions against unjust dismissal. At least the latter group, as the
California and Michigan bills propose, could properly be excluded
from any new statutory procedures. In addition, since American em-
ployment legislation has traditionally differentiated between the pub-
lic and private sectors, it may be politically advantageous to maintain
that distinction by limiting any new protections to private industry.
5. Organized Employees
Most of the arguments in favor of just cause requirements have
been phrased in terms of protecting "unorganized" workers. The
Michigan bill expressly excludes employees "protected" by a union
94. Howlett, Due Process for Nonunionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SECoND ANNUAL MEETING, INDusTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 164, 167 (B. Dennis, ed. 1980).
95. Summers, supra note 2, at 525; Mich. H.B. 5155, § 2(c) (1983); N.J.A.B. 1832, § 1
(1980).
96. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2880(b) (1984).
97. Summers, supra note 2, at 526; Mich. H.B. 5155, § 2(d) (1983).
98. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2880(a) (1984).
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contract. 99 The New Jersey bill more specifically limits protection to
an employee "without the benefit of... a collective bargaining agree-
ment that contains a grievance procedure covering these matters
which terminates in binding arbitration."100 The California bill takes
the tack of requiring prior exhaustion of an employer's internal proce-
dures that "have been devised with substantial employee involve-
ment."10 1 Montana's new law does not apply to employees covered by
written collective bargaining agreements or written contracts for a set
term. 0 2
There is plainly the possibility of a federal preemption problem in
covering unionized workers, as any state statute would necessarily af-
fect collective bargaining and the enforcement of union contracts
under the National Labor Relations Act and other federal labor laws.
Arguably, there are several applicable strands of Supreme Court doc-
trine, pointing in somewhat different directions. First, state law
claims are preempted if they are "substantially dependent" upon an
analysis of the terms of a collective agreement 0 3 On the other hand,
"minimum state labor standards" may be imposed on union and non-
union employees alike.104 Perhaps most pertinent, the Supreme
Court has generally taken a liberal attitude toward state regulation in
the areas of employment discrimination,105 unemployment compen-
staion,' 06 and similar welfare matters of a compelling local concern.10 7
The federal courts of appeals are divided. When an employee covered
by a union contract is fired for exercising such a traditional state right
as filing a workers' compensation claim, there is some tendency to find
no preemption. 08 But claims of retaliatory discharges for filing safety
and health complaints have led to divergent preemption rulings
within the same federal circuit.109
99. Mich. H.B. 5155, § 2(c) (1983).
100. N.J.A.B. 1832, § 1 (1980).
101. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2888(a) (1984).
102. Mont. H.B. 241, as enacted, § 7(2) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1987).
103. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985); IBEW v. Heckler, 107 S.
Ct. 2167, 2168 (1987).
104. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); cf. Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987).
105. E.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S.
714 (1963).
106. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
107. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297 (1959).
108. Compare Peabody Galion v. A. V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1981), Herring v.
Prince Macaroni, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986) and Baldracchi v. Pratt &
Whitney Div., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (no preemption) with Johnson v. Huss-
man Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986) and Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 2
I.E.R. (BNA) 354 (7th Cir. 1987) (preemption).
109. Compare Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.
1984) (preemption when employee filed complaint with Federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration) with Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th
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At the very least I think a state would have sufficiently deep-
rooted local interests to justify protecting employees within its bor-
ders from being importuned to commit a crime or violate some other
basic public policy. Furthermore, by a modest expansion of either the
"minimum labor standards" or "employment discrimination" excep-
tions to the preemption doctrine, it seems that a state might be able to
prohibit all arbitrary, abusive, or unjust dismissals, except those based
on union activity." 0 These lines are not all that easy to draw, how-
ever, and it is understandable that several bills and the new Montana
law have opted not to cover employees subject to a collective
agreement.3-u
Nevertheless, except for the possible conservation of limited ad-
ministrative resources, I see no principled grounds for treating organ-
ized employees differently from the unorganized with respect to basic
statutory protections. If we conclude that workers in general are enti-
tled to invoke a just cause standard, the same public policy should ap-
ply to all, regardless of the existence of parallel protections in a
collective bargaining agreement. There is federal precedent for such
an approach in both the NLRA and civil rights legislation, which
clearly extend to workers who are also covered by antidiscrimination
guarantees in their union contracts.1 12 Furthermore, one might ask
why the state should shield nonunion workers gratis, and force union-
ized employees to expend bargaining chips to obtain the same
safeguards.
For me the difficult question is the proper relationship of statutory
and contractual rights and remedies, when both are available. Sum-
mers would give the contract priority to the extent of requiring a disci-
plined employee to exhaust the contractual grievance procedure, and
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985) (no preemption when employee noti-
fied local health officials about spoiled milk). Cf. De Soto v. Yellow Freight Sys-
tems, 811 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987) (preemption when employee refused to drive
truck he mistakenly believed was not legally licensed or registered). But cf.
Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3235 (7th Cir. 1987) (no
preemption of state tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy when supervisor adverted to supposed immoral sexual behav-
ior of employee's wife). See generally Note, NLRA Preemption of State Law Ac-
tions for Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy, 19 U. MIcH. J.L. REF.
441 (1986).
110. Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972
(1982). Of course, if a collective bargaining agreement is present containing a
blanket prohibition of unjust discharge, there is not only the possibility of unfair
labor practice preemption under the NLRA; there is also the possibility of federal
contract law preemption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1982). Teamsters Local No. 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962).
111. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
112. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977); Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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would make any arbitral award that is obtained final and binding.113
But he would not let the union enter a binding settlement with the
employer, as it now may do under Vaca v. Sipes,114 subject only to its
duty of fair representation toward the employee. Instead, if the union
declines to arbitrate under the contract, Summers would permit the
employee to proceed on his or her own to the neutral tribunal pro-
vided by the state. He believes only "the most stubborn individual"
would persist in the face of the union's settlement. From my experi-
ence with the United Automobile Workers' Public Review Board, I
suspect there are more such "stubborn individuals" around than Sum-
mers imagines. My own inclination would be to put more trust in the
flexibility of collective bargaining, and to leave some of these ques-
tions for future resolution amidst the counterpoint of particular facts,
negotiated tradeoffs, dollar costs, and the union's overriding duty of
fair representation. I see no reason here to engage in the same close
scrutiny of union, employer, or arbitrator conduct that may be appro-
priate in dealing with such sensitive and divisive issues as race and sex
discrimination.115 Having said all that, I realize there may be much
practical wisdom in the decision to finesse all these complications by
excluding unionized workers from the new statutory protections.
C. Discipline Covered
Advocates of employee protection have usually talked about pro-
tection against discharge, the so-called economic "capital punishment"
of industrial relations. That is dramatic. But an extended suspension,
a demotion, a denied promotion, or an onerous job assignment, while
not as blatant, can be almost as distressful. Such job actions should be
regarded as the functional equivalent of discharge. The Michigan bill
may be politically astute in the way it puts the matter, in effect creat-
ing a "constructive discharge," though it requires the employee to en-
gage in a variation on Russian roulette: "Discharge includes a
resignation or quit that results from an improper or unreasonable ac-
tion or inaction of the employer."116 The new Montana law explicitly
reaches "constructive discharge," defined as a "voluntary termination
of employment by an employee because of a situation created by an act
or omission of the employer.., so intolerable that voluntary termina-
tion is the only reasonable alternative."1 17
European experience indicates that protections against unjust dis-
cipline will inevitably force inquiries into an employer's handling of
"redundancies," that is, layoffs or other employee reassignments to
113. Summers, supra note 2, at 528.
114. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
115. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977).
116. Mich. H.B. 5155, § 2(b) (1983).
117. Mont. H.B. 241, as enacted, § 3(1) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(1) (1987).
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meet economic downturns or reduced production demands. Other-
wise, there is simply too much opportunity to disguise unfair treat-
ment of an individual employee as part of an employer's overall
reaction to business oscillations. This hardly imposes an oppressive
burden on employers. All they need do is establish almost any sort of
rational, verifiable criterion - seniority, skills, past productivity, etc.
- as the basis for their job determinations, and they are practically
impervious to challenge.
D. Adjudicators and Procedure
A new statute could pick and choose across a broad spectrum of
possible enforcement devices. Most persons would probably rule out
the courts as too formal, too costly, and already overloaded. Existing
administrative agencies, either the labor relations boards or the civil
rights commissions, are more likely candidates. Robert Howlett, the
former chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission,
favors placing administration in the hands of state labor depart-
ments.' 18 He feels the hearing officers of the conventional labor rela-
tions agencies are more attuned to organizational than to individual
concerns. He also believes the whole proposal would face less political
opposition if it were divorced from the usual union-employer regula-
tory context. My view is that a question like this is best answered by
reference to the governmental structure and industrial relations cli-
mate of each state.
More significant, I think, than the locus of administration is
whether we follow the hearing officer-agency model or the arbitration
model. I hope I am not merely exhibiting crass professional bias when
I join the overwhelming majority of my fellow arbitrators who have
addressed the issue in concluding that arbitration is the superior pro-
cedure for "just cause" determinations. The California and Michigan
bills provide for arbitration, and the Montana statute makes it a pre-
ferred option."19 Adopting the arbitration format would immediately
make available the vast body of arbitral precedent concerning sub-
stance and procedure that has been developed in countless decisions
over the years. It would permit the use of an established nucleus of
experienced arbitrators, and of the growing number of young, able as-
pirants who are caught in the vicious circle of being denied experience
because they have no experience. It would facilitate maximum flexi-
bility, at least until more is learned about future caseloads, because
there would be no need to engage a large permanent staff at the out-
set. It would leave open the option, however, of utilizing a mix, as
118. Howlett, supra note 94, at 167.
119. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2282 (1984); Mich. H.B. 5155, § 6 (1983); Mont. H.B. 241, as en-
acted, § 9 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1987).
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New York has done, of "staff" arbitrators and of free-lancers drawn
from a panel for ad hoc assignments. The relative informality and
speed of arbitration - though both those qualities are now often much
eroded - should also appeal to rank-and-file employees. Finally, just
cause rulings do not call for the minute technical expertise that may
be essential in a permanent hearing officer specializing in unemploy-
ment compensation or Social Security claims.
Although arbitration is the customary capstone of collectively bar-
gained grievance procedures, only a small percentage of the grievances
that are filed reach arbitration. Arguably the whole system would col-
lapse if all claims went to the final step. Most are settled or dropped
along the way. It would seem highly desireable to have some compa-
rable sieve in the statutory procedure. The most obvious would be a
preliminary mediation stage of minimum duration, and in California
and Michigan bills so provide.12O Howlett would have an official in the
administering agency make a "reasonable cause" determination before
a case could go to arbitration.1 2l I agree such a requirement makes
sense, especially if the state is to bear the major share of the cost of
the proceedings.
Another advantage of the arbitral model is that the award is final
and binding, without the need for agency adoption or review as in the
case of the hearing officer's report or decision. Ordinarily, of course, a
private arbitration award will not be set aside by the courts unless the
arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction or the award was obtained by
fraud, collusion, or similar means. That ought to be the standard here.
Since a statutory arbitrator is imposed on the parties, however, there
may be considerable pressure to adopt the stiffer "substantial evi-
dence" standard. Moreover, some state constitutions require that rul-
ings by public agencies and officials be supported by "competent,
material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole."'122 If "substantial evidence" is the standard, one way or an-
other, it raises the grim prospect of verbatim transcripts, with all the
attendant delays and added costs. Although some persons seem to eye
a tape recorder in a hearing room the way certain people are said to
view cameras - as if cameras were out to capture their souls - the
sponsor of the Michigan bill was persuaded to accept this cheap, handy
device as a sufficient means of documentation,123 and I should hope
others would follow suit.
120. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2881(d) (1984); Mich. H.B. 5155, § 5 (1983).
121. Howlett, supra note 94, at 169.
122. E.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 28.
123. Mich. A.B. 5155, § 9(5) (1983).
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E. Remedies
Arbitrators under labor contracts have demonstrated both ingenu-
ity and common sense in devising a range of remedies to counter un-
just discharge and other discipline. They have, for instance, evolved
the cardinal principle that the punishment must fit not only the of-
fense but also the offender. What is suitable for the short-term em-
ployee of spotty record is not right for the long-time veteran of
irreproachable deportment. Presumably statutory arbitrators will
temper their judgments accordingly.
More specifically, remedies for unjust discharge in the United
States have traditionally included reinstatement with or without back
pay. In Europe reinstatement is the exception. Apparently it is felt
that the lone, unwanted employee can seldom regain a comfortable
position in his old workplace, and it is better to award him severance
pay and let him go. A number of American experts also seem to be-
lieve that reinstatement is unfeasible without the presence of a labor
union to support the restored employee. I think awarding severance
pay in lieu of reinstatement is an option the arbitrator should have.
But I see no reason for precluding reinstatement out of an exagger-
ated regard for the employee's psychic well-being. American workers
are probably more transient than their European counterparts, and
they are used to handling unfamiliar job situations. A reinstatement
order also gives them extra bargaining leverage in working out any
future adjustment with the employer. I would grant reinstatement
when it seemed appropriate, and let the employee decide what use to
make of the award.
The California bill offers a rather elaborate set of alternative reme-
dies for the arbitrator, including reinstatement, backpay with interest,
income and related losses for two years if reinstatement is not appro-
priate, and attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party.1 24 The
Michigan bill is somewhat similar. It includes a "severance payment"
but not attorneys' fees.'25 The new Montana legislation expressly
preempts common law actions but, somewhat surprisingly, retains pu-
nitive damages for "actual" fraud or malice, in addition to the more
common lost wages and benefits, with interest, here limited to a pe-
riod of four years from the date of discharge.1 26 Interim earnings are
to be deducted. Reinstatement is not mentioned.
124. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2884 (1984).
125. Mich. H.B. 5155, § 10(2) (1983). Future versions of the bill are expected to author-
ize attorneys' fees.
126. Mont. H.B. 241, as enacted, §§ 5, 8 (1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-905, 39-2-913
(1987).
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F. Costs
The arbitrator's fee and expenses under collectively bargained ar-
rangements are normally shared, 50-50, by the parties, although occa-
sionally the loser pays all. Each side bears its own representation
costs, if any. Some years ago my former colleague, Judge Harry Ed-
wards, calculated that the typical one-day hearing costs a union
$2200;127 that might be a prohibitive figure for many individual em-
ployees, especially those out of work. Clyde Summers declares that
"in principle" under the statutory scheme the state should cover ad-
ministrative costs and the arbitrator's fee, just as it bears the expense
of courts and judges.328 He would allow a nominal filing fee, perhaps
$100, to discourage frivolous claims. Howlett would require such a fee
at the point a case is referred to arbitration by a screening officer. 9
In theory one cannot fault that approach. But there may be practi-
cal problems in implementing it. There is now a strong tradition in
the collective bargaining sector that the parties shall pay the arbitra-
tor. Although a few states, like Connecticut and Wisconsin,130 provide
arbitrators at public expense, the trend has been, in a kind of reversal
of Gresham's Law, for privately paid arbitrators to replace publicly
paid arbitrators. Thus, prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the old United
States Conciliation Service furnished free arbitration through staff
personnel. Now, of course, the FMCS simply offers parties the names
of private arbitrators. New York continued to provide a choice of staff
arbitrators paid by the state and "panel" arbitrators whom the parties
had to pay.131 But Robben Fleming reported that "the amount of free
service is declining by deliberate choice of the state agency."1 3 2 The
list of private arbitrators was publicized and the availability of staff
personnel was not. Moreover, in a period of severe financial strin-
gency for many state governments, the prospect of one more new and
perhaps substantial expense is sure to generate even further oppostion
to a proposal that is not going to elicit universal acclaim in any event.
The California and Michigan bills heeded the counsel of prudence and
provided that the employer and the employee shall bear "equally" the
cost of the arbitrator.133 Under the Montana law, a discharged em-
ployee who prevails in the arbitration is entitled to have the employer
127. Edwards, Problems Facing Arbitration Process, in Lab. Rel. Y.B. - 1977 (BNA)
206 (1978).
128. Summers, supra note 2, at 524.
129. Howlett, supra note 94, at 169. The California bill requires the employee and the
employer each to file $500 with the state mediation service "for the costs of
resolving the dispute." Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2881(c) (1984).
130. Summers, supra note 2, at 524; Mueller, The Role of the Wisconsin Employment
Board Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 47, 49.
131. Summers, supra note 2, at 522.
132. R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PRocEss 51 (1965).
133. Cal. A.B. 3017, § 2888(b)(3) (1984); Mich. H.B. 5155, § 7 (1983).
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pay "the arbitrator's fees and all costs of arbitration."134 Either party
whose valid offer of arbitration is rejected will be awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees if he prevails in the ensuing court action.135
If the state pays the bill, the state will almost certainly, like Con-
necticut, set the rate.136 That may be fine for fledgling arbitrators, but
it may not be adequate for obtaining the services of highly qualified,
experienced professionals. In my opinion, it would probably be best
for the statute to leave open the issue of amount, letting the parties
themselves determine the level of quality for which they are willing to
pay.
V. CONCLUSION
Unjust dismissal makes no sense ethically, little sense legally, and
at best marginal sense in industrial relations and economic terms. Its
elimination is fast becoming a moral and historical imperative. This is
not "uncharted territory," 37 as some timid courts have exclaimed.
This is terrain that has been carefully mapped in thousands of arbitra-
tion decisions since the Second World War. That body of arbitral pre-
cedent and a large and potentially much larger body of arbitrators
stand ready to be drawn upon in the forging of a new set of statutory
guarantees.
The debates that remain over this detail or that detail of proposed
legislation should not obscure one central fact. In this the twentieth
anniversary year of Blades's truly seminal piece,138 an academic con-
sensus has blossomed, a judicial consensus has taken root, and the
makings of a legislative consensus have been planted. Whether it will
be in the coming decade or the following, we shall shortly see on the
legal landscape only the decaying husk of the doctrine of employment
at will. The far more wholesome theory of just cause will have taken
its place.
134. Mont. H.B. 241, as enacted, § 9(5) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(5) (1978).
135. MONT. H.B. 241, as enacted § 9(4) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(4) (1987).
136. Summers, supr note 2, at 522.
137. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 174, 319 A.2d 174, 175 (1974).
138. See supra note 1.
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